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There is something special about the way in which images, graphs, and the
like present their contents to us. It is easy enough to say that in some sense
our access to the information carried by such representations is rather direct
or immediate, but rather difficult to unpack just what this special kind of
directness or immediacy consists in. The fact that images seem so special is
the source of the privileged place they hold as a means of presenting data as
well as of the suspicion with which many regard them. What are the
epistemic advantages and disadvantages of using such representations?
And along what dimensions relevant to these issues do different kinds of
representation--images, graphs, descriptions, lists, etc.--relate to one
another?
The overall project of which this paper is a part is both descriptive
and normative. How do representations actually work, and what makes
some better than others, given a set of goals? Scientists have many goals in
presenting data, from gaining understanding of a phenomenon to
convincing others that they are correct. This paper does not sort out those
goals and discuss the uses of images with respect to them in detail. Rather,
it presents some dimensions along which representations differ from one
another that seem particularly useful in addressing how scientists should
and should not use representations.
Section one introduces the kinds of issues on which this paper
focuses. Section two explains what it is for a representation to make its
content immediately available. Immediacy consists of three things: the
extractability of information, syntactic salience, and semantic salience.
Immediacy is not the same thing as explicitness, though the two are related,
and immediacy is not in and of itself distinctive of images and the like.
Almost any representation makes some aspects of its content immediately
available. What distinguishes images and the like, as section three explains,
is that they make information across many levels of abstraction immediately
1 Thanks to Adina Roskies for extensive, helpful comments on this paper
and in particular for helping to avoid a serious misstep in section four. Remaining
problems are my problems.
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available. Section four explains how representations can differ in the way
they make abstractions from their determinate content immediately
available, and how this helps and hinders our epistemic goals. Section five
makes a speculative claim about just why this feature of many
representations, images in particular, confers such epistemic advantages.
1. The general contrast
It helps to begin with a plausible story, which has some helpful flaws, about
how we use representations for presenting data. Descriptions are good at
providing coarse-grained, qualitative and quantitative information about a
data set. They are good at this because they can present information at
arbitrary levels of abstraction. A description is not bound to reveal the
determinate values of temperature over time: it can reveal a general trend
without going into any details. This is not to deny that descriptions are also
good at presenting some fine-grained, quantitative information but this is
not distinctive of descriptions. Hector Levesque points out that "the
representational expressiveness of a language…is not so much in what it
allows you to say, but in what it allows you to leave unsaid." (1988, 370)
Levesque had first-order logic in mind when he made that comment, but
the point generalizes quite nicely.
Graphs and images, by contrast, are good at providing fine-grained,
quantitative information about a data set. They cannot present information
at arbitrary levels of abstraction: they cannot leave arbitrarily much unsaid.
They can, however, present vast amounts of information about a great
many features at, minimally, some levels of abstraction. The weather
report's image tells you just how precipitation intensity changes across the
Midwest and a graph can tell you just how temperature changes throughout
the day. An fMRI image will let you know where and how brain activity
differs between two tasks for an individual, while an x-ray tells those who
are properly trained very much about the different kinds of tissue in a
body.2 For now, the plausible story is that images and the like must deliver
a lot of rather specific information while descriptions and their ken are able
to deliver arbitrarily little. If we only need a little bit of information,
descriptions are the superior means of conveying it, but if we have a lot of
very specific information and we and want to deliver it, images are best.
As promised, this plausible story has some helpful flaws that can
lead us to a better understanding of why images are valuable tools for
2 Perhaps diagrams occupy some middle ground between images on the
one hand and descriptions on the other, but the terminology in this area is nowhere
near regimented.
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presenting information. First, there is a sense in which descriptions are
even better than images and graphs at delivering fine-grained, quantitative
information. It's difficult to tell just what the numerical value of
temperature is at a given time just by inspecting an accurate graph thereof.
Exactly which temperature does that shade of red stand for? And exactly
how hard is it snowing over the Champlain valley? That's not to say that
images cannot provide this information, but they provide it in a way that
makes the specific quantitative bits rather difficult to extract from them. By
contrast, descriptions present few such difficulties. They can list the
precipitation rates and temperatures to arbitrary levels of precision. In fact,
a list of numerals, much more like a description than a graph or image, is
preferable to the latter if these specifics are what you want.
Second, images are often used in order to extract rather coarsegrained qualitative claims about their objects, not for determining finegrained, quantitative information. We can see from the fMRI that there is
more activity in the infero-temporal cortex than in the pre-frontal cortex.
The Doppler radar shows that it's snowing hard in the Adirondacks now,
but not in the Upper Valley. The specifics are often beside the point when
we use images. What makes images valuable is not that they carry many
very specific bits of information but the fact that they allow us to get at
precisely the abstract bits of information we want. We need to determine
fine-grained, often quantitative information about something in order to
make an image of it, but the image is not used for presenting such
information. In this sense, images seem to serve a function similar to
descriptions--saying very little--while descriptions are often employed to
make very specific claims. There is a rift between what the plausible story
says images and the like are good for and what we seem to use images for.
So what, then, is the key difference between images and descriptions?
The way in which images encode such vast amounts of information
allows viewers readily to abstract a great number of claims from that
information. The information sought when viewing an image is often
coarse-grained and qualitative, which is similar to what is sought when
reading and making descriptions. The way in which images present finegrained, quantitative information, however, makes much coarse-grained,
qualitative info readily available. Such immediate availability of a great many
pieces of abstract information accounts for some of the epistemological
weight given to images and graphs, not to mention photographs.
Descriptions, by contrast, are very selective in the pieces of abstract
information that they provide. This means that there are limits on what one
can do with descriptions, as opposed to images. In the right circumstances,
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of course, those limits might be just what one needs. So, we use
descriptions, lists, and so on when we are already in a position to know
what pieces of information are the valuable ones and which can be safely
discarded. Images are at their best when we have a lot of information, but
are still looking for what is important. They present a vast amount of
information in the service of allowing us to figure out what pieces of
information matter most for our purposes. In this way, images are tools for
figuring out what is important while descriptions and lists are used when we
already know what matters. It is not surprising, then, that images are used
in the process of diagnosing problems, while they rarely count as diagnoses
of problems. The diagnosis itself is a description. It presents the
information that matters, and only that information.
It is surprisingly difficult to unpack just what it means to say that
images provide viewers with ready access to a greater number of pieces of
information.
The next section claims that representations present
information to us immediately when they satisfy three conditions. These
conditions are a way of explicating the distinction between what Jill Larkin
and Herbert Simon (1987, 67) call informational equivalence of
representations and their computational equivalence. Representations can
be alike in the information that they carry but differ in how they make that
information available to their consumers. The topic of sections two and
three is thus isolating the relevant dimensions along which representations
can differ computationally while remaining informationally alike.3 Section
four looks at how one can use these features of representations to explain
why some are better for some tasks than others, and section five addresses
why these features of images lend them a privileged epistemic place among
representations, which can be used or abused.
2. Immediacy
First, a piece of information is immediately available in a representation
only if it is extractable from that representation. Extractability just means
just that there is a non-semantic feature of the representation in virtue of
possessing which it carries the piece of information in question and no other,
more specific piece of information. For example, red regions of the Doppler radar
Larkin and Simon do not draw this distinction in the best way that they
could, it seems. Computational differences, for them, include only the inferences
that one is able to make easily based on the representation (1987, 67). As we will
see below, one thing that distinguishes representations from one another is whether
an inference is required at all in order to get at certain abstractions from a
representation's determinate content.
3
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image indicate stormy weather of a certain intensity, nothing more. Being
red says nothing about the location of such a disturbance: the relative
location of the red region is responsible for that. A certain kind of curve in a
bubble chamber indicates a pion's trajectory, and a proper part of that curve
indicates a proper part of its trajectory. We know it indicates a pion's
trajectory because only pions would trace a curve of that shape through the
chamber.
Extractability concerns how non-semantic features of
representations are responsible for the information that they carry. Some
representations are such that we can identify some of their features, like
color of their surfaces, shapes of curves, or what have you, as being
responsible for indicating certain aspects of the world that they represent,
and nothing more specific than that.
Extractability is a feature of any kind representation and not just
images. A list of numerals representing coordinates and determinate
temperatures renders many specific pieces of information extractable. One
can identify a given triple of numerals that indicates a temperature at a
specific location and nothing else. If, however, we were to represent the
entire data set with a name, 'Ralph', we would be unable to find features of
the latter representation responsible for carrying information about a
specific temperature at a specific location. This is true even though the
name and the detailed list are about the same thing: they are informationally
equivalent but not computationally equivalent, in Larkin and Simon's
terminology. An inference is required from the representation 'Ralph' to an
abstraction from its determinate content, while no inference is needed from
the list because the relevant information is extractable. Necessary for a
representation making a given piece of information immediately available is
that it carries that piece of information in extractable form.4
Extractability says nothing about the consumers of representations.
Whether a piece of information is extractable depends on (1) the content of
the representation and (2) how the non-semantic features of a
representation relate to its content. Immediacy cannot amount merely to
extractability, because immediacy concerns how we use representations.

For more on extractability, but in the context of perceptual, mental
representations, see Kulvicki (2004, 2005). Extractability relates, albeit at some
remove, to what Levesque (1988) calls "vivid" knowledge representation, but it
would take us too far off course to unpack that relation here. Similarly,
extractability relates to what is explicitly represented, as opposed to implicitly
represented--see Cummins 1983, Dretske 1988, Kirsh 1991, and Clark 1992--but
making that connection clear is beyond the scope of this paper.
44
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The other two conditions, syntactic and semantic salience, relate consumers
of representations to the information that those representations carry.
In order to present a piece of information immediately, the
properties in virtue of which a representation carries that information must
be perceptually salient: they need to stand out. Let's call this condition
syntactic salience, because it says something about consumers of
representations relate to their non-semantic features, not about how they
relate to their contents. It's difficult to know exactly what representations
must be like for their syntactic features to be sufficiently salient, but a
philosophy paper is no the place to figure that out in any case. Cognitive
psychologists are in a good position to study the specifics, and it is easy
enough to come up with examples of cases in which syntactic features of
representations are salient and those in which they are not. For now it
suffices to point out that the properties in question are the kinds of things
that your average, perhaps appropriately trained perceiver could be in a
position to notice without much effort, and to give some examples of this.
So, for example, imagine we want to know where a surface has
temperatures within a given range: say between 98 and 102 degrees Celsius.
We can make an image or graph of that surface that represents
temperatures in that range with shades of red, and all others with shades of
green. In this case, the features of the representation responsible for
carrying the information that interests us stand out. If however, all
temperatures are represented with shades of red, albeit different ones, then
it will be more difficult to figure out which regions have the temperatures
of interest because we are bad at recognizing and re-identifying specific
shades of red. These two graphs differ in the syntactic salience of the
properties that carry the information of interest. Similarly, if we were to
make the saturation of the color stand for temperature, so greater saturation
stands for greater temperature, but allow the use of arbitrary hues within
such a graph, almost all syntactic salience will be lost. It is very difficult to
sort colors based on saturation alone, especially when their hues differ
arbitrarily. Many are unaware of what saturation is, in any case, and it is
often confused with brightness. Such a representation would carry the
same information as its more useful cousin, and it would even carry that
information in extractable form. But this representation would lack the
syntactic salience requisite for immediacy.
Extractability and syntactic salience do not suffice for immediacy.
In addition, it must be easy to learn with which properties the perceptually
salient properties of the representation correlate. That is, for pieces of
information to be readily available, there must be a plan of correlation
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between features of the representation and features of the data that is easy
to grasp. This is semantic salience. Without semantic salience, interpreting a
representation will be difficult, defeating its purpose. As with syntactic
salience, semantic salience will depend on the training, backgrounds, and
innate perceptual and cognitive capacities of the consumers of
representations. (See, e.g., Gattis 2001, 2002)
Imagine we have five shades of red of varying brightness that we
wish to stand for five temperature ranges in a graph. The obvious way to
do this is to make the temperature ranges from lowest to highest
correspond to the colors from dullest to brightest, or conversely. We could
make the middle color correspond to the highest temperature range, and
the brightest color correspond to a temperature range in the middle, but
that would make the graph impressively difficult to interpret. It just so
happens that in this case the isomorphism between temperatures and the
relation of being greater than on the one hand, and colors and the relation of
being brighter than on the other, is semantically salient. We easily interpret
such representations, just as we easily interpret a thermometer, for which
the heights of a column of mercury and the relation being taller than are
isomorphic to the temperatures and the relation of being greater than. As we
will see in the next section, isomorphism is, as many have suspected,
important for understanding images, but it is far from the whole story.
Isomorphism is important because it contributes to immediacy, and, as the
next section argues, to the immediacy of information across levels of
abstraction. Without leaning heavily on research, there is little more to say
about what makes some plans of correlation salient while others are not,
but it is easy to come up with examples on both sides just as we could with
syntactic salience.
Immediacy is extractability, syntactic salience, and semantic
salience. A bit of information is extractable or it is not, and this depends on
how the non-semantic features of a representation are responsible for
determining the semantic features of a representation. Syntactic salience
and semantic salience are matters of degree, and they depend on the
consumers of representations, their training, backgrounds, and innate
perceptual capacities. It makes sense to talk about degrees of immediacy,
even though not all of its components can be characterized that way.5
5 Edward Tufte's work on representations, especially his Envisioning
Information (1990), and The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (1983), is rather
explicitly concerned with syntactic and semantic salience, and implicitly concerned
with extractability. In discussing some data maps, he claims: "Only a picture can
carry such a volume of data in such a small space. Furthermore, all that data,
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Immediacy does not suffice to show why images and graphs seem to be
such special kinds of representation, however, since descriptions and lists of
numerals make information immediately available as well. It turns out that
what is distinctive of images and graphs is that they present information
immediately across many levels of abstraction. The next section unpacks this
idea.
3. Immediacy across levels of abstraction
Let's say we have a data set that tells us the temperature along a 2D surface.
One way of presenting the data is as a list of triples of numerals: two for
coordinates on the surface and one for the temperature at that location.
The numerals in the list present data at a specific level of abstraction
determined by the precision of the temperature and location measurements.
This information is extractable from the representation: we can find features
of the representation, say the triple (1, 1, 42) that specify a location and
temperature.
Often the information of interest is at some remove from the
determinate values of temperature at specific locations, however. We need
to abstract from the data presented by the list to the desired level of detail,
but would this amount to extracting the information? That is, if we do not
care so much that the temperature is 42, but are only interested in whether
it is between 39 and 42 degrees, can we extract that abstract bit of
information from the list of numerals? You might think not. The relevant
features of the list are the shapes of the numerals that constitute it and their
relations to one another. It's easy to find such features responsible for
carrying information about a specific temperature at a specific location--e.g.,
(1, 1, 42)--but it is tricky at best to find some feature responsible for
carrying the information that the temperature is between 39 and 42 degrees
and nothing more specific than that. It seems as though the parts of the list carry
more information than we want. So, one can certainly get at the more
abstract information by first decoding the list and making an inference from
the determinate content--that the temperature in the top left corner is 42
degrees--to the more abstract information that one needs--that the
temperature there is between 39 and 42 degrees--but this does not make the
latter information immediately available. In a sense, the list stands between
one and the data of interest, as any premise stands between one and the
conclusion of an inference.
thanks to the graphic, can be thought about in many different ways at many
different levels of analysis…." (1983, 16) That last remark of Tufte's will be quite
relevant in Section 3.
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There is, however, an odd sense in which such abstract information
is genuinely extractable from the list of numerals, appearances to the contrary
notwithstanding. It is always possible to abstract over numeral types. This
amounts to being sensitive to some abstract shape property that includes all
of the shapes of the numerals that stand for values in the range of interest.
So, if the list says that the value is 42 degrees at a certain point, but you are
interested in values between 39 and 42 and nothing more specific, you can
extract that info if you are sensitive to the abstract shape property '39'-or'40'-or-'41'-or-'42'. The problem with the list is not extractability, it is
syntactic salience. Abstractions over numeral types are generally not at all
syntactically salient, so for this reason when we want to get at the abstract
data of interest, we decode the list and then make an inference from the
determinate data. While the list presents some information immediately, it
does not present information across levels of abstraction immediately.
By contrast, consider a 2D image of the temperature along that
surface. This is just another way of presenting the same data. The darker a
region of the graph, the colder the corresponding region of the represented
surface is. This image can carry all of the info that the list carries, and no
more information, but it is much easier to abstract from the image's detail.
With the image, abstractions over the data are extractable and syntactically
salient (not to mention semantically salient). For example, one could scour
the list to figure out that region A is warmer than region B and that the
difference between A and B is greater than the difference between B and C.
It's easier to figure this out using the image because the region of the image
corresponding to A is lighter than the region corresponding to B and the
difference in lightness between A and B is greater than the difference
between B and C. There is no need to decode the image or a part thereof
in all of its specific detail before abstracting to these more general claims.
Abstracting over features of the graph itself and then decoding it gets you to
abstract features of the data. This is what Tufte was pointing out when he
claimed that we can get at the data in an image "at many different levels of
analysis…" (Tufte 1983, 16).
It's easy enough to say that this results from there being an
isomorphism between regions of the image and their features and regions
of the represented surface and their features, namely temperatures. Many
agree--e.g. Barwise and Etchemendy 1995, Gurr et al. 1998, Stenning 2002-that isomorphism, or the more general notion of homomorphism, marks
off graphs and images from other kinds of representation. Without being
inaccurate, this covering term often used to describe images and graphs
misses what makes this kind of isomorphism so interesting, vis-à-vis the
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goals of those who need to use the representation. Isomorphisms are
multifarious and ubiquitous, which means that they are in and of
themselves unhelpful.6 The graph of temperature exhibits isomorphisms
across many levels of abstraction from the determinate data points.
Moreover, this particular isomorphism is syntactically and semantically
salient. So, regardless of how abstract or specific one's information needs
are, those bits of information are extractable from the graph of temperature
along a surface in a syntactically and semantically salient manner. If we
want the particular temperature range between 39 and 42 degrees to be
even more salient, we can just code those temperatures with a different hue
than we use to code the rest. Then they stand out with respect to the rest,
and relative to one another as well.
The foregoing puts us in a position to draw a general lesson about
the contrast between graphs and images on the one hand and descriptions
and lists of numerals, on the other. With lists numerals and descriptions,
the rule is: decode first, ask questions later. Only once we have figured out the
specific content of the list can we abstract from its details to something we
are interested in. As a result, the list itself is of little if any help in getting
from the specific data to our more abstract goals. It dumps its determinate
content onto us and we are left to sort out the mess. Graphs and images
endure quite a bit of interrogation before they need to be decoded. For this
reason, such representations can help us get from the most determinate
details represented to where we want to be. Reasoning with the graph-drawing abstractions over its features--allows us to draw conclusions about
the graph's content. Images and graphs are tools for discovery and
diagnosis, interestingly enough, because they present a wealth of
information in such a way as to allow us to ignore what simply does not
matter. Descriptions are not helpful in this manner, and they are thus best
suited to stating the conclusions we draw rather than presenting the data on
the basis of which we draw them. The next section looks at how we can
6 Nelson Goodman (1976) famously pointed out that representations will
in general resemble what they are about in indefinitely many ways, and he used this to
argue against the claim that resemblances between representations and what they
represent could in and of themselves do any interesting work in explaining
representational kinds. Here I am making a similar point about isomorphisms,
which are, if anything, more ubiquitous than bona fide resemblances. Absent an
account of why certain kinds of isomorphism are interesting and relevant, it is
unhelpful to point out that certain representations are isomorphic to what they are
about. I make a similar point about perceptual, mental representations in (Kulvicki
2004).
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use immediacy to better understand how we use different ways of
representing data.
4. Floors, Ceilings, and Raising the Roof
Any representation of temperature picks out some temperature at some
level of detail. Excellent thermometers and detailed graphs represent
temperatures accurately to hundredths or thousandths of degrees. Others
are content to put us in the ballpark of the nearest degree, and some are
even more coarse-grained than that. So, any representation has a
determinate floor, characterized by the most specific piece of information
about some determinable that it carries. One can always abstract from the
determinate floor, of course, as when one reads the thermometer that says
79 degrees just to get at the information that it’s warm outside. Just as
representations have determinate floors, they also have abstract ceilings,
beyond which information is not immediately available. One can access
abstractions above the ceiling, but doing so amounts to a "decode first,
abstract later" process rather than something more immediate. Two
dimensions along which we can compare representations, then, concern the
distances between their floors and ceilings and the number of salient steps
between them.
Lists of numerals make information about the determinate floor
immediately available, but information more abstract than the floor is
usually obtained via an inference from the decoded determinate
information. These lists have very low ceilings, so most of what we do with
them involves decoding first and then asking questions. By contrast, the
2D image of temperature makes information at many levels of abstraction
immediately available without the need for an inference from determinate
content. The image has a much higher ceiling than the list, and there are
many ways to manipulate the number of salient steps between the image's
floor and its ceiling. Exactly what one has to do in order to manipulate
these features of representations will depend on the particular kind of
representation one is using, and one's audience. For some representations,
abstractions up to a certain point are perceptually salient or easily learned
while beyond that point they are not. Sometimes abstractions are salient for
just about any consumer of the representation, but sometimes they are only
salient for a select few with the requisite experience using such
representations. The upper limit on what is immediately represented can be
set by syntactic or semantic salience, as well as by extractability.
For example, one can color the numerals in a list depending on the
abstract ranges of values they represent. All of the numerals representing
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temperatures between 40 and 49 degrees can be colored orange, those
between 35 and 39 green and those between 50 and 55 red. This raises the
list's roof (or ceiling) by making abstract pieces of information extractable
in a salient manner. But notice that this modification raises the roof
without making many intermediate steps up from the floor immediately
available. The modified representation makes its determinate floor
immediately available as well as the abstract comparisons between large
ranges of temperatures, such as between temps in the 30s and those in the
40s. It does not make comparisons within two-degree ranges immediately
available, however, even though those are closer to the determinate floor
than the more abstract comparisons just mentioned. This is a good thing,
since often we care about, for example, the determinate values and only
certain coarse grained comparisons between them. Imagine a speedometer
that reads out speeds in green numerals when below or at the speed limit
and in red numerals when above it. Comparisons that are in between the
floor and rather high ceiling of such a representational system are not
immediately available. By contrast, imagine an image of temperature over a
surface where a different shade of blue stands for each of the determinate
temperatures. This renders comparisons at many of the abstraction steps
from floor to ceiling immediately available, though it does not make some
coarse-grained comparisons--such as between the 30s and the 40s--more
salient than others.
Sometimes we don't care about the determinate floor at all.
Perhaps one does not care how fast one is going, beyond knowing whether
it is above or below the speed limit. Similarly, one may not care about
precise oil pressure aside from whether it is dangerously low, just as
sometimes one only cares whether a temperature is in the "red zone" or
not. In these cases, one raises the floor of a representation by eliminating
the determinate information that it carries in favor of the abstract stuff one
cares about. When one raises the floor, one changes the information that a
representation carries, eliminating much of it. When one raises the ceiling,
by contrast, one leaves the information carried alone and merely makes
abstract bits of it immediately available that were not so available earlier.
When we think of whether a representation is useful, misleading,
both, or something in between, it is often a consideration of its floor,
ceiling, and the steps in between that helps to figure it out. Similarly, these
considerations are precisely what we need if we want to make a
representation more useful for certain purposes, or, of course if we want to
make it more misleading. The next section sketches how these features of
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representations affect the epistemic weight we take them to have and our
choices concerning how to represent data.
5. Images' epistemic weight
Perception gives us access to many properties in our environment, at many
levels of abstraction. We are not only able to focus on the determinate,
dark green color of a tree, but we can also see it as green, or merely as dark.
In fact, it seems as though our access to such abstract properties, like being
green as opposed to being any particular shade of green, is just as direct as
our access to more determinate properties. Similar facts hold for our
perception of spatial properties, audible properties, and so on. There is no
need to offer an account of direct perception here and it can even remain
an open question whether perception really reveals both determinate and
abstract properties of things in an equally direct manner. Perhaps, for
example, it is only by a fast and often unnoticed inference that we come to
know about greenness, as opposed to some determinate shade of green.
For now what matters is that we seem to have ready perceptual access to
properties across many levels of abstraction. Depending on our needs at
the time, different bits of information about our environment are important
or worth ignoring. Our perceptual systems give us access to a lot of
information in a manner that allows its selective use.
We perceive all representations--linguistic, imagistic, or otherwise-but the foregoing suggests that images present their contents to us in a way
that mimics the way in which we perceptually acquire information more
generally. It's wrong, of course, to claim that we simply perceive the content
of an image, since the contents of images are often the kinds of things that
are imperceptible, at least by visual means. But the images themselves, like
all representations, are perceptible, and the way in which their perceptible
features relate to features of their contents renders our contact with that
content much like our perceptual contact with the image itself.
More specifically, the features of such representations that are
responsible for them having the contents that they do are perceptible, and
in immediate representations those features stand out. This is just what
syntactic salience amounts to. The way in which such features correlate
with features of the representation's content is also easily grasped: the
representation is semantically salient. And finally, the result of abstracting
over the syntactic features of the representation is a syntactic feature that
stands for an abstraction over the determinate content of the
representation. That is, information is immediately available across levels of
abstraction. By noticing that one region of the image is lighter than
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another--and thus abstracting away from the determinate brightness of each
region and from the specific degree to which the regions differ from one
another--one isolates a feature of the image that carries the information that
one represented region is cooler than the other. Perceptual abstractions
over the syntactic features of the representation saliently relate to
abstractions over features of the representation's content.
The foregoing helps to explain the special epistemic place that
pictures, images, and graphs can hold in relation to other kinds of
representation. It is not just that such representations are particularly useful
for certain purposes, but that interpreting many of them mimics the way in
which we glean information about our environment perceptually. A
searching, perceptual investigation of an image can straightforwardly be
translated into a searching, perceptual investigation of its content.7 This
provides a clearer sense of the difference between representations of the
decode-first-ask-questions-later variety--such as descriptions and lists--and
images. We can reason with images rather than just decoding them and
reasoning about their contents, in the sense that perceptual abstractions
from their determinate details can lead us to conclusions about their
contents. Asking questions of the images themselves yields insights
regarding their contents.
Images can make us feel rather reliably and intimately connected
with their contents because they rely on the perceptual resources that we
have on hand for investigating the world at large. These resources are tried
and true, as far as most of us are concerned. This does not mean, in
general, that we will regard the contents of images as particularly reliable, but
rather that we will regard ourselves as being reliably and intimately in touch
with that content, regardless of whether the content is accurate. We have
reason to trust our grasp of the content, obtained as it was through
perception-like means. Our grasp of abstractions from the content of a list,
by contrast, even if that content is the same as the determinate information

7 Cf. Kendall Walton (1990) who explains the differences between kinds
of representation in terms of the make believe interaction that they support. He
thinks that we are able to make believe that our perceiving of pictures is perceiving
their contents, and that this seems right because the way in which we acquire
information about those contents mimics the way in which we would acquire
information about them perceptually. (Walton 1990, 305-9) See also my (2006,
239-44) for a discussion of Walton on this topic. It seems as though the structural
feature of images discussed in this paper can figure in an explanation of why such
representations support the kinds of make believe that Walton thinks they do.
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carried by an image, is not perceptually acquired in the way that our grasp
of such abstractions is when we look at an image.
While we feel in touch with an image's content, it might be quite
difficult to isolate a scientist's important claim amidst the wealth of data an
image can present. The point of scientific papers--the take-home message-is often much more abstract than the wealth of data that an image presents.
In fMRI studies, for example, the point is often that there is greater activity
in some areas of the brain while performing a given task than there is while
performing a certain baseline task. So the particular shape of the region of
activity, and the particulars of exactly how much greater than the baseline
the activity happens to be often do not figure in the conclusion that the
researchers want to draw. Such particulars matter even less in studies that
average results for a few test subjects and present the results in one image.
The particulars of the data are data, of course. They are worthy of
presentation and oftentimes the best way to present such a wealth of data
will be in an image. But as with many images the point is often not the
particulars of that wealth of data but a conclusion considerably more
abstract.
The abstract conclusions of scientific experiments, especially fMRI
studies are rarely presented in imagistic form. They are written out, and the
reader is expected to be able to see the conclusion in the more detailed
image that represents the whole wealth of data. It is certainly possible to
make an image that more closely matches the conclusion at its level of
detail. All we need to do is raise the floor of the representation, so that we
throw away information that is irrelevant to the conclusion at hand. In
such a case, the most determinate claim that the image makes is in line with
the conclusion that the scientists want to draw. Such an image could be
presented next to the image that carries all of the information about the
data, so that readers could see how the abstraction relates to the wealth of
information that the scientists acquired.8
The problem with doing this, which might be a reason such
abstract images are shunned, is that such images are apt to seem cartoonish.
Rather than being characterized by subtle changes in color and brightness,
such as characterize photographs as well as ordinary fMRI images, these
Michael Lynch (1988, esp. 157-60) discusses this in the context of
biological illustrations of cells, in which a photograph of a cell is juxtaposed with a
diagram thereof. The diagram raises the floor of the representation--although
Lynch does not use this terminology--and thus makes it easier for viewers of the
photograph to see the features of the cell in the photo. That is, the diagram makes
the subset of information in the photo that is relevant stand out.
8
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images would be composed of rather large regions of uniform hue. Such a
representation would accurately capture the result that the scientists are
interested in, and presenting it in such a way would aid in the audience's
understanding of those results. As an aid to understanding, however, it
might fail to seem particularly scientific, since cartoonishness is generally
regarded as a mark against a representation. Cartoons are not sources of
knowledge so much as sources of entertainment.
The fact that photos and other representations that carry vast
amounts of information immediately, and thus have very low floors and
rather high ceilings makes them quite appealing as media for representing
data. When we raise the floors of such representations, which often brings
them in line with the information that we wish to convey, we lose the
appeal of the richly informative representation and wind up with something
that can seem much less scientific because it seems diagrammatic and even
cartoonish. This is not to say we should not make use of such
representations, however. They can actually be just what we need,
especially if the consumers of such representation, who in the case of fMRI
are often the public at large, are unable readily to extract the relevant bits of
information from the all-too-informative image.
The foregoing discussion is far from complete. The point was
merely to suggest how knowledge of representations' floors, roofs, and the
salient steps between them can aid the discussion of why certain choices for
presenting data are favored or shunned and how certain favored or
shunned practices might be put to better use.
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Appendix: Raising the roof, and then some
The following extended example illustrates the ideas explicated above.
First consider a list:
(x-coordinate (1-4), y-coordinate (1-4), temperature (0-6))
1, 1, 0
1, 2, 2
1, 3, 2
1, 4, 3
2, 1, 2
2, 2, 2
2, 3, 3
2, 4, 4

3, 1, 3
3, 2, 3
3, 3, 4
3, 4, 5
4, 1, 3
4, 2, 4
4, 3, 4
4, 4, 6

The next step raises the roof a bit by making the spatial relations between
values more immediate in that it is easier to extract information about
relative locations. This makes features of the representation that are
responsible for coding relative locations isomorphic to the locations that
they represent in a semantically and syntactically salient manner.
0

2

2

3

2

2

3

4

3

3

4

5

3

4

4

6

Raise the roof a bit more by color-coding groups of numerals based on the
ranges to which they belong. This is a goal-directed modification of the
graph in that each color stands for some range of temperatures, but the
sizes of the ranges are far from uniform. Green covers 0-2 but yellow only
covers 3 while red covers 4-5 and purple 6. There is a sense in which this
coding is homomorphic to the temperatures, as long as one posits an
appropriate similarity relation among the relevant colors, but we cannot call
this an isomorphism because of the different temperature ranges covered
by each color. A graph like this could tell us which regions of a surface are
at a safe temperature (green), which are borderline (orange), which are
dangerous (red) and which are, say, critically dangerous (purple). This
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coloration does not change the information carried by the original graph, so
much as make certain abstractions from the determinate data more
syntactically and semantically salient. Thus, this contributes to immediacy
of the data of interest.
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4

6

The next move does not raise the roof so much as it raises the floor.
Determinate information about temperature is discarded in favor of a
colored matrix that picks out the temperature ranges of interest. Unlike
raising the roof, this move changes the information carried by the
representation by disposing of a lot of it. If the determinate temperatures
are only relevant insofar as they fit into one of the four color categories
below, however, there is no harm in raising the floor to make the relevant
information more easily accessible: the irrelevant details cannot be a bother
once you raise the floor. The downside of raising the floor is that the result
can seem a bit cartoonish. To the extent that one wants to represent rather
abstract bits of information using an imagistic medium, one flirts with
making a representation that looks like a cartoon. Since cartoonish
representations are not typically the kind of representation on which we rely
for knowledge, especially when it is knowledge of a world that we know to
be vastly complex, the risk with raising the floor is that one will not be
taken seriously.
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